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Abstract
We propose multi-type probabilistic serial (MPS)
and multi-type random priority (MRP) as exten-
sions of the well known PS and RP mecha-
nisms to the multi-type resource allocation prob-
lem (MTRA) with partial preferences. In our set-
ting, there are multiple types of divisible items,
and a group of agents who have partial order
preferences over bundles consisting of one item
of each type. We show that for the unrestricted
domain of partial order preferences, no mech-
anism satisfies both sd-efficiency and sd-envy-
freeness. Notwithstanding this impossibility result,
our main message is positive: When agents’ pref-
erences are represented by acyclic CP-nets, MPS
satisfies sd-efficiency, sd-envy-freeness, ordinal
fairness, and upper-invariance, while MRP satis-
fies ex-post-efficiency, sd-strategyproofness, and
upper-invariance, recovering the properties of PS
and RP.
1 Introduction
Consider the example of rationing [Elster, 1992] two types of
divisible resources: food (F) and drink (D) among two fam-
ilies who have heterogeneous preferences over combinations
of food and drink they wish to consume. For example, a fam-
ily may prefer water with rice, and milk with wheat. How
should we distribute available resources to the families fairly
and efficiently?
In this paper, we consider the problem of divisible multi-
type resource allocation (MTRA) [Mackin and Xia, 2016]
with partial preferences. Here, there are p ≥ 1 types of n
divisible items per type, with one unit of supply of each item,
and a group of n agents with partial preferences over receiv-
ing bundles consisting of one unit of each type. Our goal is to
design mechanisms to fairly and efficiently allocate one unit
of items of each type to every agent given their partial prefer-
ences over bundles.
Examples of our setting include the division of land and
water resources [Segal-Halevi, 2017]. In cloud computing,
agents have preferences over their share of how long they use
combinations of computational resources such as CPU, mem-
ory, and storage [Ghodsi et al., 2011; Ghodsi et al., 2012;
Grandl et al., 2015]. Partial preferences are natural in such
problems since the number of bundles grows exponentially
with the number of types, and it is often unreasonable to ex-
pect agents to form complete preferences over all bundles.
Unfortunately, it is well known that no mechanism which
assigns each item fully to a single agent satisfies the basic
fairness property of equal treatment of equals, meaning that
everything else being equal, agents with the same preferences
should receive the same share of the resources. For example,
whenever two agents have equal and strict preferences over
items, it is easy to see that no such mechanism satisfies equal
treatment of equals.
Fractional mechanisms overcome this impossibility and
possess more favorable properties. Indeed, the random prior-
ity (RP) [Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 1998] and probabilis-
tic serial (PS) [Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001] mechanisms
are two well-known fractional mechanisms for single-type
resource allocations which satisfy equal treatment of equals
as well as different notions of fairness and efficiency. RP
satisfies ex-post-efficiency, weak-sd-envy-freeness, and sd-
strategyproofness, PS is sd-efficient, sd-envy-free, and weak-
sd-strategyproof [Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001]. PS is the
only mechanism that simultaneously satisfies sd-efficiency,
sd-envy-freeness, and bounded invariance [Bogomolnaia and
Heo, 2012; Bogomolnaia, 2015]. Following in this vein,
we focus on the class of fractional mechanisms adapted to
MTRAs and partial preferences, whose output allocates frac-
tional shares of bundles to the agents.
Our work is the first to consider the design of fair and
efficient mechanisms for MTRAs with partial preferences,
and the first to extend fractional mechanisms to MTRAs and
partial preferences, to the best of our knowledge. Katta and
Sethuraman [2006] mention that PS can be extended to partial
orders but we are not aware of a followup work. Monte and
Tumennasan [2015] and Mackin and Xia [2016] consider the
problem of MTRA under linear preferences, but do not fully
address the issue of fairness. Ghodsi et al. [2011] consider the
problem of allocating multiple types of resources, when the
resources of each type are indistinguishable, and agents have
different demands for each type of resource. However, the
problem of finding fair and efficient assignments for MTRA
with partial preferences remains open.
Our mechanisms output fractional assignments, where
each agent receives fractional shares of bundles consisting of
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Table 1: Properties of MRP and MPS under different domain restrictions on partial preferences. A ”Y” indicates that the row mechanism
satisfies the column property, and an ”N” indicates that it does not. Results annotated with † are from [Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001], ‡
are from [Hashimoto et al., 2014]. The rest are results proved in this paper.
Mechanism and Preference Domain SE EPE OF SEF WSEF UI SS WSS
General partial preferences N† Y N‡ N† Y N N Y
MRP CP-nets N† Y N‡ N† Y Y Y Y
CP-nets with common dependency graph N† Y N‡ N† Y Y Y Y
General partial preferences Y N N N Y N N† N
MPS CP-nets Y N Y Y Y Y N† N
CP-nets with common dependency graph Y N Y Y Y Y N† Y
an item of each type, which together amount to one unit per
type. In settings such as cloud computing, agents’ consump-
tion at any point in time must consist of a bundle composed
of every type of item simultaneously at the same rate. The
fractional assignments output by our mechanisms also spec-
ify for each agent how to form bundles for consumption from
the assigned fractional shares of items. Our setting may be in-
terpreted as a special case of cake cutting [Procaccia, 2013],
where the cake is divided into parts of unit size of p types,
and n parts per type, and agents have complex combinatorial
preferences over being assigned combinations of parts of the
cake which amount to a unit of each type.
Our Contributions. Our work is the first to provide fair and
efficient mechanisms for MTRAs, and the first to extend PS
and RP both to MTRAs and to partial preferences, to the best
of our knowledge. We propose MPS and MRP as extensions
of PS and RP to MTRAs respectively. Our main message is
positive: Under the well-known and natural domain restric-
tion of CP-net preferences [Boutilier et al., 2004a], MRP and
MPS satisfy all of the fairness and efficiency properties of
their counterparts for single types and complete preferences.
Our technical results are summarized in Table 1. We extend
stochastic dominance to compare two fractional assignments
under partial preferences. Here, a fractional assignment A is
said to stochastically dominate another assignment B w.r.t.
an agents’ partial preferences, if at any bundle, the fractional
share of weakly dominating bundles in A is larger than the
fractional shares of more preferred bundles in B according to
her preferences.
For the unrestricted domain of general partial preferences,
unfortunately, no mechanism satisfies both sd-efficiency (SE)
and sd-envy-freeness (SEF) as we prove in Proposition 2. De-
spite this impossibility result, MRP and MPS retain several
of the properties of their counterparts RP and PS: We show
in Theorem 1 that MRP satisfies ex-post-efficiency (EPE),
weak-sd-envy-freeness (WSEF), weak-sd-strategyproofness
(WSS), and in Theorem 2 that MPS is sd-efficient (SE) and
weak-sd-envy-free (WSEF).
Remarkably, we recover the fairness and efficiency prop-
erties of MPS and the truthfulness and invariance properties
for MRP and MPS under the well-known and natural domain
restriction of CP-net preferences [Boutilier et al., 2004a]. We
show in:
- Theorem 3, that MRP is sd-strategyproof (SS),
- Theorem 4, that MPS satisfies sd-envy-freeness (SEF) and
ordinal fairness (OF), and
- Proposition 4 that MPS is upper-invariant (UI), and in
Proposition 5 that MPS satisfies weak-sd-strategyproofness
(WSS) under the special case where agents’ CP-nets share a
common dependency structure.
At a high level, in MRP and MPS, agents consume their fa-
vorite bundle for which all items are still available at any point
in time, until the supply of an item in the bundle is exhausted,
instead of their favorite item as they would in RP and PS.
Our proofs for sd-efficiency and weak-sd-strategyproofness
of MPS rely on non-trivial extensions of the techniques used
in [Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001], and a careful analysis of
the consumption of bundles.
2 Related Work and Discussion
We are not aware of any previous works which extend RP
and PS to MTRAs. MTRAs belong to a long line of research
on mechanism design for multi-agent resource allocation (see
[Chevaleyre et al., 2006] for a survey), where the literature
focuses on the settings with a single type of items. Mackin
and Xia [2016] characterize serial dictatorships for MTRA
by strategyproofness, neutrality, and non-bossiness. The
exchange economy of multi-type housing markets [Moulin,
1995] is considered in [Sikdar et al., 2018; Sikdar et al., 2017]
under lexicographic preferences, while Fujita et al. [2015]
consider the exchange economy where agents may consume
multiple units of a single type of items under lexicographic
preferences.
Our work is the first to extend RP and PS under partial pref-
erences, to the best of our knowledge despite the vast litera-
ture on fractional assignments. The remarkable properties of
PS has encouraged extensions to several settings. Hashimoto
et al. [2014] provide two characterizations of PS: (1) by sd-
efficiency, sd-envy-freeness, and upper-invariance, and (2)
by ordinal fairness and non-wastefulness. In [Heo, 2014;
Hatfield, 2009] there is a single type of items, and agents
have multi-unit demands. In [Saban and Sethuraman, 2014],
the supply items may be different, while agents have unit
demand and are assumed to have lexicographic preferences.
Other works extend RP and PS to settings where indifferences
are allowed [Katta and Sethuraman, 2006; Heo and Yılmaz,
2015; Aziz et al., 2015; Hosseini and Larson, 2019]. Yil-
maz [2009] and Athanassoglou and Sethuraman [2011] ex-
tend PS to the housing markets problem [Shapley and Scarf,
1974]. Bouveret et al. [2010] study the complexity of com-
puting fair and efficient allocations under partial preferences
represented by SCI-nets for allocation problems with a single
type of indivisible items.
2.1 Compact Preferences
Compact preference representations are a common approach
to deal with the preference formation and elicitation bottle-
neck faced in MTRAs, where the number of bundles grows
exponentially with the number of types. CP-nets [Boutilier
et al., 2004b] are perhaps the most well-studied and nat-
ural compact preference representation language allowing
agents to express conditional (in)dependence of their pref-
erences over combinations of different types. Sikdar et al.
[2017] design mechanisms for multi-type housing markets
under lexicographic extensions of CP-nets. Several works
assume that agents’ CP-net preferences have a common de-
pendence structure for group decision making (see [Lang and
Xia, 2016] for a recent survey).
3 Preliminaries
A multi-type resource allocation problem (MTRA) [Mackin
and Xia, 2016], is given by a tuple (N,M,R). Here,
(1) N = {1, . . . , n} is a set of agents. (2) M = D1∪· · ·∪Dp
is a set of items of p types, where for each i ≤ p, Di is a set
of n items of type i, and there is one unit of supply of each
item in M . We use D = D1 × · · · ×Dp to denote the set of
bundles. (3) R = (j)j≤n is a preference profile, where for
each j ≤ n, j represents the preference of agent j.
Bundles. For any type i ≤ p, we use ki to refer to the k-th
item of type i. Each bundle x ∈ D is a p-tuple, and we use
o ∈ x to indicate that bundle x contains item o. We define
T = {D1, . . . , Dp}, and for any S ⊆ T , we define
∏
S =
×D∈SD, and −S = T \ S. For any S ⊆ T , Sˆ ⊆ T \ S, and
any x ∈ ∏S ,y ∈ ∏Sˆ , (x,y) denotes the bundles consisting
of all items in x and y. For any S ⊆ T , D ∈ T \ S, and any
x ∈ S, o ∈ D, (o,x) denotes the bundles consisting of o and
the items in x.
Partial Preferences and Profiles. A partial preference is
a partial order overD which is an irreflexive, anti-symmetric,
and transitive binary relation. Given a partial preference 
over D, we define the corresponding preference graph de-
noted G to be a directed graph whose nodes correspond to
the bundles in D, and for every x,y ∈ D, there is an directed
edge (x,y) if and only if x  y and there exists no z ∈ D
such that x  z and z  y. We useR to denote the set of all
possible preference profiles. We use −j to denote the pref-
erences of agents in N \ {j}. Given a partial order  over D,
we define the upper contour set of  at a bundle x ∈ D as
U(,x) = {xˆ : xˆ  x or xˆ = x}.
Acyclic CP-nets. A CP-net [Boutilier et al., 2004a]  over
the set of variables D is given by two components (i) a di-
rected graph G = (T,E) called the dependency graph, and
(ii) for each i ≤ p, there is a conditional preference ta-
ble CPT (Di) that contains a linear order x over Di for
each x ∈ ∏Pa(Di), where Pa(Di) is the set of types cor-
responding to the parents of Di in G. When G is (a)cyclic
we say that  is a (a)cyclic CP-net. The partial order in-
duced by an acyclic CP-net  over D is the transitive clo-
sure of {(o,x, z)  (oˆ,x, z)} : i ≤ p; o, oˆ ∈ Di;x ∈∏
Pa(Di)
; o x oˆ; z ∈∏−(Pa(Di)∪Di).
Figure 1: an acyclic CP-net and a general partial preference
Example 1. Consider MTRA (N,M,R) with p ≥ 2 types
where N = {1, 2},M = {11, 21, 12, 22}, where 12 is item
1 of type 2 and so on. Let agent 1’s preferences 1 be rep-
resented by the acyclic CP-net in Figure 1, where the depen-
dency graph (Figure 1 (a)) shows that her preference on type
2 depends on her assignment of type 1. The corresponding
conditional preference tables (Figure 1 (b)) show that agent 1
prefers 12 with 11, and she prefers 22 with 21. This induces
the preference graph in Figure 1 (c) which happens to be a
linear order. Let agent 2’s preferences 2 be represented by
the preference graph in Figure 1 (d) which represents a partial
order, where 1122 is the least preferred bundle, and providing
no information on the relative ordering of other bundles.
Assignments. A deterministic assignment A : N → D is a
one to one mapping from agents to bundles such that no item
is assigned to more than one agent. A fractional allocation
shows the fractional shares an agent acquires over D, repre-
sented by a vector p = [px]x∈D, p ∈ [0, 1]1×|D| such that∑
x∈D px = 1. We use Π to denote the set of all possible
fractional allocations on an agent. A fractional assignment
is a combination of all agents’ fractional allocations, repre-
sented by a matrix P = [pj,x]j≤n,x∈D, P ∈ [0, 1]|N |×|D|,
such that (i) for every j ≤ n, ∑x∈D pj,x = 1, (ii) for every
o ∈ M , So = {x : x ∈ D and o ∈ x},
∑
j≤n,x∈So pj,x = 1.
The j-th row of P represents agent j’s fractional allocation
under P , denoted P (j). We use P to denote the set of all
possible fractional assignment matrices. If a fractional as-
signment matrix can be represented as a probability distri-
bution over deterministic assignments, we say the matrix is
realizable.
Mechanisms. A mechanism f : R → P is a mapping from
profiles to fractional assignments. For any profile R ∈ R,
we will use f(R) to refer to the fractional assignment matrix
output by f , and for any agent j ≤ n and any bundle x ∈ D,
we use f(R)j,x to refer to the value of the element of the
matrix indexed by j and x.
Stochastic Dominance. We extend the notion of stochas-
tic dominance [Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001] to compare
fractional assignments for MTRAs under partial preferences.
Definition 1. (stochastic dominance) Given a partial prefer-
ence  over D, the stochastic dominance relation associated
with , denoted sd is a weak ordering over Π such that
for any pair of fractional allocations p, q ∈ Π, p stochasti-
cally dominates q, denoted p sd q, if and only if for every
x ∈ D,∑xˆ∈U(,x) pxˆ ≥∑xˆ∈U(,x) qxˆ.
We write P sdj Q to denote P (j) sdj Q(j). We use
P sd Q to indicate that P sdj Q for every j ≤ n and
P 6= Q.
Example 2. Consider the situation in Example 1 and the
three matrices (1), (2), and (3) shown below. The four
upper contour sets for agent 1 are {1112}, {1112, 1122},
{1112, 1122, 2122}, and {1112, 1122, 2112, 2122}. The con-
sumptions of the four upper contour sets in matrix (2) for
agent 1 are 0.5, 0.5, 1, 1 respectively and are 0, 0.5, 0.5, 1
in matrix (3). The former is greater than or equal to the latter
respectively, and the same can be concluded for agent 2 by
considering the upper contour sets {1112}, {2122}, {2112},
and {1112, 1122, 2112, 2122}. Hence matrix (2) stochasti-
cally dominates matrix (3). We can check that matrix (2) does
not dominate matrix (1) and the reverse is true by considering
the sets of {1112} and {2112} for agent 2.
1112 1122 2112 2122
1 0.5 0.5 0 0
2 0 0 0.5 0.5
(1)
1112 1122 2112 2122
1 0.5 0 0 0.5
2 0.5 0 0 0.5
(2)
1112 1122 2112 2122
1 0 0.5 0.5 0
2 0.5 0 0 0.5
(3)
Desirable Properties. A fractional assignment P satisfies:
(i) sd-efficiency, if there is no fractional assignment Q 6= P
such that Q sd P , (ii) ex-post-efficiency, if P can be
represented as a probability distribution over sd-efficient de-
terministic assignments, (iii) sd-envy-freeness, if for every
pair of agents j, jˆ ≤ n, P (j) sdj P (jˆ), (iv) weak-sd-
envy-freeness, if for every pair of agents j, jˆ ≤ n, P (jˆ) sdj
P (j) =⇒ P (j) = P (jˆ), and (v) ordinal fairness, if for
every bundle x ∈ D and every pair of agents j, jˆ ≤ n with
Pj,x > 0,
∑
xˆ∈U(j ,x) Pj,xˆ ≤
∑
xˆ∈U(jˆ ,x) Pjˆ,xˆ
A mechanism f satisfies X ∈ {sd-efficiency, ex-post-
efficiency, sd-envy-freeness,weak-sd-envy-freeness, ordinal
fairness}, if for every R ∈ R, f(R) satisfies X . A mech-
anism f satisfies: (i) sd-strategyproofness if for every
profile R ∈ R, every agent j ≤ n, every R′ ∈ R such
that R′ = (′j ,−j), it holds that f(R) sdj f(R′), and
(ii) weak-sd-strategyproofness if for every profile R ∈ R,
every agent j ≤ n, every R′ ∈ R such that R′ = (′j ,−j),
it holds that f(R′) sdj f(R) =⇒ f(R′)(j) = f(R)(j).
Given any partial preferences , we denote |B by the re-
striction of  to B ⊆ D, i.e., |B is a preference relation
over B such that for all x,y ∈ B, x |B y ⇔ x  y. Then
for any j ≤ n, ′j is an upper invariant transformation ofj at x ∈ D under a fractional assignment P if for some
Z ⊆ {y ∈ D | Pj,y = 0}, U(′j ,x) = U(j ,x) \ Z and
′j |U(′j ,x)=j |U(′j ,x). A mechanism f satisfies upper
invariance if it holds that f(R)jˆ,x = f(R
′)jˆ,x for every
jˆ ≤ n, j ≤ n, R ∈ R, R′ ∈ R, and x ∈ D, such that
R′ = (′j ,−j) and ′j is an upper invariant transformation
of j at x under f(R).
4 Extensions of RP and PS Mechanisms to
MTRAs with Partial Preferences
We propose MRP (Algorithm 1) and MPS (Algorithm 2) as
extensions of the RP [Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 1998] and
PS [Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001] mechanisms to MTRAs
with partial preferences. Given an instance of MTRA with
agents’ partial preferences, MRP and MPS operate on a mod-
ified preference profile of strict preferences, where for ev-
ery agent with partial preferences , an arbitrary determin-
istic topological sorting is applied to obtain a strict order-
ing ′ over D, such that for any pair of bundles x,y ∈ D,
x  y =⇒ x ′ y. Given a strict order ′ obtained in this
way, and remaining M ′, we use Ext(′,M ′) to denote the
first available bundle in ′, which we refer to as the agents’
favorite bundle. It is easy to see that no available bundle is
preferred over Ext(′,M ′) according to . We now present
MRP and MPS as Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 1 MRP
Input: An MTRA (N,M,R)
Output: Assignment matrix P
1: For each j ≤ n, compute a linear ordering ′j corre-
sponding to a deterministic topological sort of Gj .
2: P ← 0 and M ′ ←M .
3: Pick a random priority order B over agents.
4: Successively pick a highest priority agent j∗ according to
B. x∗ ← Ext(′j ,M ′) and set Pj∗,x∗ ← 1. Remove j∗,
and remove all items contained by x∗ in M ′.
5: return P
Given an instance of MTRA with agents’ partial prefer-
ences, MRP fixes an arbitrary deterministic topological sort-
ing ′ of agents’ preferences, and sorts the agents uniformly
at random. Then agents get one unit of their favorite available
bundle Ext(′,M ′) M ′ turn by turn.
Given an instance of MTRA with agents’ partial prefer-
ences, MPS involves applying the PS mechanism to a modi-
fied profile ′ over D using an arbitrary deterministic topo-
logical sorting in multiple rounds as follows. In each round,
each agent consumes their favorite available bundle by con-
suming each item in the bundle at a uniform rate of one unit
of an item per type per unit of time, until one of the bundles
being consumed becomes unavailable because the supply for
one of the items in it is exhausted. Although MPS (or MRP)
always form the same topological sorting given the same par-
tial preferences, the output of MPS (or MRP) may be different
for different topological sortings as Example 3 shows.
Algorithm 2 MPS
Input: An MTRA (N,M,R)
Output: Assignment matrix P
1: For each j ≤ n, compute a linear ordering ′j corre-
sponding to a deterministic topological sort of Gj .
2: P ← 0 andM ′ ←M . For every o ∈M , supply(o)← 1,
B ← ∅, progress ← 0.
3: while M ′ 6= ∅ do
4: top(j)← Ext(′j ,M ′) for every agent j ≤ n.
5: Consume.
5.1: For each o ∈ M ′, consumers(o) ← |{j ∈ N :
o is in top(j)}|.
5.2: progress ← mino∈M ′ supply(o)consumers(o) .
5.3: For each j ≤ n, Pj,top(j) ← Pj,top(j) + progress.
5.4: For each o ∈ M ′, supply(o) ← supply(o) −
progress × consumers(o).
6: B ← arg mino∈M ′ supply(o)consumers(o) , M ′ ←M ′ \B
7: return P
Example 3. Consider the situation in Example 1, the topo-
logical sort of agent 1’s preference is 1112 ′ 1122 ′
2122 ′ 2112 but both 2112 ′ 1112 ′ 2122 ′ 1122 and
1112 ′ 2122 ′ 2112 ′ 1122 can be the topological sort
of agent 2’s preference. If the topological sort of agent 2 is
the former, in MPS, agent 1 consumes 1112 and agent 2 con-
sumes 2112 at the beginning. When they both consume 0.5
fraction, 12 is exhausted. 1112 and 2112 become unavailable.
They turn to identify the next bundles in line 4. For example,
the first two bundles 2112 and 1112 are unavailable for agent
2, so she turns to the third bundle 2122. Agent 1 turns to
1122. Then MPS goes to next round of consumption until all
left items are exhausted at the same time. The result is shown
in matrix (1) in Example 2. However, if the topological sort
of agent 2 is the latter, agent 1 and agent 2 both get 0.5 of
1112 and 0.5 of 2122 as matrix (2) shows. It is easy to check
that MRP has the same conclusion.
There is a unique best available bundle w.r.t. any acyclic
CP-net preference, and remaining supply of items, which can
be computed in polynomial time by induction on the types ac-
cording to the dependency graph as we show in Proposition 1.
This is an extension of the well-known result of Boutilier et
al. [2004a] that there is a unique best bundle w.r.t. any acyclic
CP-net.
Proposition 1. Let T ′ = {D′1 ⊆ D1, . . . , D′p ⊆ Dp}, D′ =∏
T ′ , and let  be any acyclic CP-net over D. Then, there
exists unique x ∈ D′ such that for every y 6= x ∈ D′, x  y.
We use Top(,M ′) to denote the best available bundle in
remaining M ′ given an acyclic CP-net . Under the domain
restriction of acyclic CP-net preferences, for any topological
sorting algorithms, Ext(′j ,M ′) is exact Top(j ,M ′) for
any M ′ and j ≤ n by Proposition 1. Therefore, we can re-
move line 1 and instead Ext(′j ,M ′) with Top(j ,M ′) in
MRP or MPS to save the time and space.
5 Properties of MRP and MPS under General
Partial Preferences
Theorem 1. Given any partial preference profile R,
MRP(R) is ex-post-efficient, weak-sd-envy-free, and weak-
sd-strategyproof.
For ex-post-efficiency, it is obvious that the first agent ac-
cording to the priority order who has a different assignment
does not have an improvement. We can prove weak-sd-envy-
freeness of MRP by just exchanging the positions of two
agents. For weak-sd-strategyproofness, if an agent wants a
larger share of a bundle x, she has to sacrifice a bundle po-
sitioned over x in the topological order, which ultimately re-
sults in a smaller share of some bundle positioned over x in
the topological order.
Remark 1. MRP is not upper invariant and sd-strategyproof
under general partial preferences.
We offer an adaptable sufficient condition for a fractional
assignment to be sd-efficient in Lemma 1 which we use in
the proof of sd-efficiency of MPS. Before we proceed with
the proofs, we introduce some notation. Given an assign-
ment matrix P and a partial preference profile R, for any
x, xˆ ∈ D, (x, xˆ) is an improvable tuple if there exists an
agent j < n such that x j xˆ and pj,xˆ > 0. We use
Imp(P,R) to denote the set of all the improvable tuples ad-
mitted by P at R. We use Imp(P ) for short when the pref-
erences are clear from the context. The result by [Bogomol-
naia and Moulin, 2001] that an assignment matrix P is sd-
efficient if and only if the binary relation Imp(P ) has no
cycle, fails to hold for MTRAs. As Example 2 shows, ma-
trix (3) is sd-inefficient, but the set of the improvable tuples,
{(1112, 1122), (1112, 2112), (1122, 2112), (2122, 2112)}, has
no cycle. Hence, Imp(P ) with no cycle is no longer the suf-
ficient condition for the sd-efficiency of P . We provide such
a sufficient condition in Lemma 1.
Definition 2. Given an assignment matrix P for an MTRA, a
set C ⊆ Imp(P ) is a generalized cycle if it holds for every
o ∈M that: if there exists an improvable tuple (x1, xˆ1) ∈ C
such that o ∈ x1, then there exists a tuple (x2, xˆ2) ∈ C, such
that o ∈ xˆ2.
Lemma 1. Given any partial preference profile R and as-
signment matrix P , P is sd-efficient if P admits no general-
ized cycle at R.
We prove Lemma 1 through a proof by contradiction which
involves finding a generalized cycle in P if there exists an
assignment matrix Q such that Q sd P , in Appendix.
Theorem 2. Given any partial preference profileR, MPS(R)
is sd-efficient and weak-sd-envy-free.
We show that MPS(R) has no generalized cycle and prove
the weak-sd-envy-freeness of MPS by induction on bundles
under the topological order in Appendix.
Remark 2. MPS is not ex-post-efficient since its output may
not be realizable when coming to multi-type resources. MPS
is not ordinally fair, sd-envy-free and upper invariant under
general partial preferences.
PS is both sd-efficient and sd-envy-free under linear prefer-
ences [Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001] but this is no longer
true under general partial preferences, as the impossibility re-
sult in Proposition 2 shows.
Proposition 2. No mechanism can satisfy both sd-efficiency
and sd-envy-freeness under general partial preferences.
A counterexample is available in Appendix.
6 Properties of MRP and MPS under Acyclic
CP-net Preferences
For convenience, we refer to a profile of acyclic CP-net pref-
erences as a CP-profile.
Theorem 3. Given any CP-profile R, MRP(R) is sd-
strategyproof.
Proof. Let P and P ′ be the expected assignment matrices
of MRP given the CP-profile R and R′ ∈ R such that
R′ = (′j ,−j) for some j ≤ n. For an arbitrary fixed
priority order, at any agent j’s turn, the set of available bun-
dles is the same under R and R′. By Proposition 1, the best
available bundle is also the same and unique. If j lies, she
may get a smaller share of her best available bundle. There-
fore, the result of a lie is stochastic dominated by the result of
truthfulness. Since this is true for any fixed priority order, P ′
is stochastic dominated by P .
Proposition 3. Given any CP-profile R, MRP(R) is upper
invariant for any other CP-profile R′.
Thanks to Proposition 1, given any upper invariant trans-
formation at some y ∈ D, if y is available in the misreport
agent’s turn, she gets the same bundle despite her lie. Oth-
erwise if y is unavailable, the lie does not affect her assign-
ment. Next, we show that MPS satisfies two stronger notions
of fairness under CP-profiles.
Theorem 4. Given any CP-profile R, MPS(R) is sd-envy-
free and ordinally fair.
Proof. W.l.o.g we only prove the case between agent 1 and
agent 2. Let P = MPS(R). Let D1 = {x ∈ D : P1,x > 0}
and n1 = |D1|. By Proposition 1, we have an order over D1
such that x1 1 x2 1 · · · 1 xn1 , xi ∈ D1 for any i ≤ n1.
For agent 2, we can define D2 and n2 and have an order over
D2, xˆ1 2 xˆ2 2 · · · 2 xˆn2 , similarly.
(1) sd-envy-freeness. We need to prove P (1) sd1 P (2).
For any y ∈ D, let xi be the least favorable bundle of
agent 1 in U(1,y) ∩ D1. If i = n1,
∑
x∈U(1,y) P1,x =∑n1
k=1 P1,xk = 1 ≥
∑
x∈U(1,y) P2,x. If i < n1, xi+1 /∈
U(1,y). When agent 1 starts to consume xi+1, yˆ is un-
available for any yˆ ∈ U(1,y). Otherwise by Proposi-
tion 1, we have xi+1 1 yˆ or xi+1 = yˆ both indicating
xi+1 ∈ U(1,y), a contradiction. Suppose t(xi) be the
time when xi is exhausted and agent 1 starts to consume
xi+1. Then
∑
x∈U(1,y) P1,x =
∑i
k=1 P1,xk = t(xi) ≥∑
x∈U(1,y) P2,x for any y ∈ D. Hence P (1) 1 P (2).
(2) ordinal fairness. We need to prove
∑
x∈U(1,y) P1,x ≤∑
x∈U(2,y) P2,x for any y ∈ D1. For any xi ∈ D1,
suppose that when xi is exhausted, agent 2 is consum-
ing xˆiˆ ∈ D2 or xˆiˆ is exhausted at the same time. If
xˆiˆ = xi, we have
∑
x∈U(1,xi) P1,x =
∑
x∈U(2,xi) P2,x.
If xˆiˆ 6= xi, since xi is available when agent 2 starts
to consume xˆiˆ, we have xˆk 2 xi for any k ≤ iˆ.
Hence,
∑
x∈U(1,xi) P1,x =
∑i
k=1 P1,xk ≤
∑iˆ
k=1 P2,xˆk ≤∑
x∈U(2,xi) P2,x. Therefore, for any y ∈ D with P1,y > 0,
we have
∑
x∈U(1,y) P1,x ≤
∑
x∈U(2,y) P2,x.
Hashimoto et al. [2014] shows that ordinal fairness charac-
terizes PS when we come to single-type resources. However,
this is not the case in MTRAs: for example, if two agents’
preferences are both as (c) in Figure 1 shows, the result that
two agents both get 0.5 1122 and 0.5 2112 is ordinally fair
but not the output of MPS. Next, we show the robustness of
MPS.
Proposition 4. Given any CP-profile R, MPS(R) is upper
invariant for any other CP-profile R′.
Given any upper invariant transformation at some y ∈ D,
the consumptions are identical until y is exhausted whether
the misreport agent is truthful or lies, by induction on the
bundles consumed by the misreport agent under R. Details
are in Appendix.
Remark 3. MPS is not weak-sd-strategyproof under CP-net
preferences.
MPS satisfies weak-sd-strategyproofness again under the
stronger domain restriction of CP-profiles with a common de-
pendency structure.
Proposition 5. Given any CP-profile R with a identical de-
pendency graph, MPS(R) is weak-sd-strategyproof for any
other CP-profile R′ with the same dependency graph.
Suppose agent 1 is the misreport agent. If MPS(R′) sd1
MPS(R), in Appendix, we show the consumption processes
of agents in any Di ∈ T are same despite agent 1 lies or not
based on the induction assumption that that is true for any
ancestor type of Di in the dependency graph.
7 Conclusion and future work
We proved that MRP and MPS possess many favorable prop-
erties, which mirror similar results for RP and PS: MRP is
more robust to manipulations, while MPS satisfies stronger
fairness properties. Unlike the single type setting, we can-
not say sd-efficiency is stronger than ex-post-efficiency for
MTRAs because not all fractional assignments are realizable.
Despite non-realizability, MPS has stronger efficiency guar-
antees than MRP since all realizable and sd-efficient assign-
ments are ex-post-efficient [Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001].
For future work, we are interested in the characterization of
MRP and MPS, and the design of realizable and sd-efficient
mechanisms.
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A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. Let T ′ = {D′1 ⊆ D1, . . . , D′p ⊆ Dp}, D′ =∏
T ′ , and let  be any acyclic CP-net over D. Then, there
exists unique x ∈ D′ such that for every y 6= x ∈ D′, x  y.
Proof. Given any acyclic CP-net , suppose the dependency
graph in the CP-net isG. AsG has no circle, there isDi1 ∈ T
such that Di1 has no parent and there is o1 in D
′
i1
such that
the agent prefers o1 than any other item in D′i1 . Then there is
Di2 ∈ T such that Pa(Di2) ⊆ {Di1}. By CPT (Di2), we
know the agent has a linear preference over Di2 given o1. So
there is o2 ∈ D′i2 such that the agent prefers o2 than any other
item in D′i2 when she is holding o1. The same procedure can
be easily adapted to obtain o3 in D′i3 , o4 in D
′
i4
,..., op in D′ip .
We claim that o1o2...op  oˆ1oˆ2...oˆp for any oˆ1oˆ2...oˆp ∈
D′ and oˆ1oˆ2...oˆp 6= o1o2...op. If o1 6= oˆ1, the agent
prefers o1 than oˆ1 and we have o1oˆ2...oˆp  oˆ1oˆ2...oˆp,
else we have o1oˆ2...oˆp = oˆ1oˆ2...oˆp. Since Pa(Dik+1) ⊆{Di1 , Di2 , ..., Dik} for any k < p, the agent prefers ok+1
than oˆk+1 given o1, o2, ..., ok or ok+1 = oˆk+1. There-
for, o1o2...okok+1oˆk+2...oˆp  o1o2...okoˆk+1oˆk+2...oˆp or
o1o2...okok+1oˆk+2...oˆp = o1o2...okoˆk+1oˆk+2...oˆp. Since 
is transitive and o1o2...op 6= oˆ1oˆ2...oˆp, we have o1o2...op 
oˆ1oˆ2...oˆp. Since the selection of ok (k ≤ p) only depends on
the selections of its parents, o1o2...op is unique.
Proof of Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. Given any partial preference profile R,
MRP(R) is ex-post-efficient, weak-sd-envy-free, and weak-
sd-strategyproof.
Proof. (1) ex-post-efficiency. Given any priority order of
agents in MRP, suppose P is the output. Assume for the
sake of contradiction that there exists an assignment matrix
Q 6= P ∈ P such that Q sd P . Let j be the first agent
in the set of agents who get different bundles between P and
Q. Then, any bundle she gets in Q is available in her turn in
MRP. Let x be the bundle agent j gets in P . Since Q sd
P , there is a bundle y ∈ D such that y j x, Qj,y > 0 and
y is available in agent j’s turn. That is contradicted with that
agent j gets x in her turn. Therefore, the result of MRP is
sd-efficient for any fixed priority order. The expected result
of MRP is the result by randomizing the agent orders, so it
is the linear combination of some sd-efficient deterministic
assignments.
(2) weak-sd-envy-freeness. W.l.o.g we only consider agent
1 and agent 2. Let assignment matrix P be the expected result
of MRP. Suppose P (2) sd1 P (1). We need to prove that
P (2) = P (1).
Suppose the topological order of agent 1’s preference in
MRP is x1 ′ x2 ′ ... ′ xnp . Let O be the set of any
possible agent order, O1 be the set of orders in which agent 1
is ranked in the front of agent 2 and O2 be the set of orders
in which agent 2 is ranked in the front of agent 1. It is obvi-
ous that {O1, O2} is one division of O. Let f : O1 7→ O2
such that for any o1 ∈ O1, f(o1) is the order that exchange
the positions of agent 1 and agent 2 in o1. f is a one-to-one
mapping and a surjection from O1 to O2 obviously.
We define the proposition F (x) as follow. For any o1 ∈
O1, o2 ∈ O2 and f(o1) = o2, either case (i) or case (ii)
happens: (i) agent 1 gets x under o1 or o2 while agent 2 gets
x under the other order; (ii) both agent 1 and agent 2 do not
get x under o1 and o2.
Then, we prove that F (x1) is true. We consider two cases.
1. For any o2 ∈ O2, let o1 ∈ O1 such that f(o1) = o2.
If agent 2 gets x1 under o2, x1 is available for agent 1
under o1 and agent 1 gets x1 under o1.
2. For any o1 ∈ O1, agent 1 is front of agent 2 and x1 is the
first bundle in topological order of agent 1’s preference,
so agent 2 has no chance to get x1 under o1.
Based on the two cases above, we can conclude that p2,x1 ≤
p1,x1 . But P (2) sd1 P (1) leads to p2,x1 ≥ p1,x1 . So
p2,x1 = p1,x1 that induce that F (x1) is true in addition to the
two points above.
Next, supposing for any i < k (k ∈ {2, 3, ..., np}), p2,xi =
p1,xi and F (xi) is true, we prove that p2,xk = p1,xk and
F (xk) is true. Consider the two cases again.
1. For any o2 ∈ O2, there is o1 ∈ O1 such that f(o1) = o2.
If agent 2 gets xk under o2, xk is available for agent 1
under o1. Besides, it means that agent 2 does not get xi
for any i < k under o2. So the case (ii) in F (xi) hap-
pens, agent 1 does not get xi under o1. Agent 1 choose
xk in her turn under o1.
2. For any o1 ∈ O1, there is o2 ∈ O2 such that f(o1) = o2.
If agent 2 dose not get xk under o1, it dose not influence
the result that the expectation of xk agent 1 gets is bigger
than what agent 2 gets. If agent 2 gets xk under o1, xk
is available for agent 1 under o2. Agent 2 does not get
xi for any i < k under o1 and the case (ii) in F (xi)
happens, that indicates Agent 1 does not get xi for any
i < k under o2. Hence, Agent 1 gets xk under o2.
The two cases above imply that p2,xk ≤ p1,xk .Since
P (2) sd1 P (1) and p2,xi = p1,xi for any i < k and
U(1,xk) ⊆ {xi : i ≤ k}, we have p2,xk ≥ p1,xk . Hence
p2,xk = p1,xk that induce that F (xk) is true in addition to the
two points above.
We have P (2) = P (1) by induction.
(3) weak-sd-strategyproofness. W.l.o.g Suppose agent 1 is
the misreport agent. Let R′ = (′1,−1) and ′ be the fixed
topological order over 1 in MRP. Let assignment matrix
P and P ′ be the expected results of MRP under R and R′.
Suppose P ′ sd1 P . Assume for the sake of contradiction
that P ′(1) 6= P (1). Let x0 be the first bundle in ′ such that
P ′1,x0 6= P1,x0 . We have P ′1,x0 > P1,x0 since P ′ sd1 P .
Under a priority order of agent, if agent 1 gets y ∈ D such
that x0 ′ y under R, x0 is unavailable under R and R′.
Hence, there is a priority order B1 such that agent 1 gets x0
under R′ and gets x1 where x1 ′ x0 under R, otherwise we
have P ′1,x1 ≤ P1,x, a contradiction. If x1 isn’t the first bundle
in ′, since P ′1,x1 = P1,x, there is a priority order B2 such
that agent 1 gets x1 under R′ and gets x2 where x2 ′ x1
under R. Continue the process until we find the first bundle
xi in ′ and there is no such priority order for xi. Hence,
P1,xi > P
′
1,xi , a contradiction with P
′ sd1 P . Therefore,
P ′(1) = P (1).
Counterexample for Remark 1.
Remark 1. MRP is not upper invariant and sd-strategyproof
under general partial preferences.
Proof. Consider the case when N = {1, 2}, M = D1 =
{11, 21}, and R = {1,2} where 1= ∅, 2= {11 2
21}. In MRP, the fixed topological orders are 11 ′ 21 for
1 and 11 ′ 21 for 2. It is obvious that agents both get
0.5 11 and 0.5 21 under this situation. Let R′ = {′1,2}
where′1= {21 ′1 11}. Under R′, agent 1 gets 21 and agent
2 gets 11. Let P and P ′ be the expected output of MRP. We
don’t have P sd1 P ′. Hence, MRP is not sd-strategyproof
under general partial preferences. ′1 is an upper invariant
transformation of 1 at 21 under P , but P ′1,21 6= P1,21 .
Hence, MRP is not upper invariant under general partial pref-
erences.
Proof of Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. Given any partial preference profile R and as-
signment matrix P , P is sd-efficient if P admits no general-
ized cycle at R.
Proof. By inversions, we assume that the assignment matrix
P admits no generalized cycle at R and there exists another
assignment matrix Q 6= P such that Q sd P . We try to
find a generalized cycle in P .
Let Nˆ = {j ∈ N : P (k) 6= Q(k)} and Nˆ 6= ∅ because
Q 6= P . Let C be the set of all tuples (x, xˆ) such that for
some j ∈ Nˆ , x j xˆ and qj,x > pj,x, qj,xˆ < pj,xˆ. Because
pj,xˆ > qj,xˆ ≥ 0, we have C ⊆ Imp(P ).
For any j ∈ Nˆ , there exists x ∈ D such that qj,x 6= pj,x.
If we have qj,x > pj,x for all qj,x 6= pj,x, we would have
1 =
∑
x∈D qj,x >
∑
x∈D pj,x = 1 which is a contradic-
tion. Hence there exists x0 ∈ D such that qj,x0 < pj,x0 .
We have
∑
x∈U(j ,x0) qj,x ≥
∑
x∈U(j ,x0) pj,x because
Q  P . Hence, there exists some x1 ∈ D such that
x1 j x0 and qj,x1 > pj,x1 , otherwise we induce a contradic-
tion that
∑
x∈U(k,x0) qj,x <
∑
x∈U(k,x0) pj,x. Therefore,
(x1,x0) ∈ C and C 6= ∅.
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that C is not a gen-
eralized cycle. Then there exists an item o such that for any
x ∈ D containing o and there is x in some tuple in C, x is
always the left component of any improvable tuple involv-
ing x. Obviously, we have qj,x = pj,x for any j /∈ Nˆ .
Suppose there exists j ∈ Nˆ such that qj,x < pj,x. Since∑
xˆ∈U(j ,x) qj,xˆ ≥
∑
xˆ∈U(j ,x) pj,xˆ, there exists some xˆ ∈
D such that xˆ j x and qj,xˆ > pj,xˆ. Hence (xˆ,x) ∈ C and
x is the right component which is a contradiction to x is al-
ways the left component. Therefore, for any j ∈ Nˆ , we have
qj,x ≥ pj,x. Since x is the left component of some tuple in
C, there exists j1 ∈ N , such that qj1,x > pj1,x. Therefore
1 =
∑
j∈N,o∈x qj,x >
∑
j∈N,o∈x pj,x = 1, a contradiction.
Therefore for any tuple (x, xˆ) ∈ C and o ∈ x, there is a tu-
ple (yˆ,y) ∈ C such that o ∈ y. Hence C is a generalized
cycle.
Proof of Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. Given any partial preference profileR, MPS(R)
is sd-efficient and weak-sd-envy-free.
Proof. (1) sd-efficiency. Suppose P is the output of MPS
given any partial preference profile R. The proof involves
showing P admits no generalized cycle, and therefore is sd-
efficient by Lemma 1.
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that P admits a gen-
eralized cycle C. Let (x, xˆ) be an arbitrary improvable tu-
ple in C. Let Seq be the partial order on M which reflects
the time when items are exhausted. Formally, for any pair of
items o and oˆ exhausted at times t and tˆ during the execution
of ESP respectively, if t ≤ tˆ, then o Seq oˆ.
Let Mˆ be the set of items that are in some left components
involved in C, and let oˆ ∈ Mˆ be one of top items according
to Seq. By Definition 2, there is an improvable tuple (x, xˆ) ∈
C such that oˆ ∈ xˆ. Since (x, xˆ) ∈ Imp(P ), there exists
an agent j ∈ N such that x j xˆ and pj,xˆ > 0. Hence
when agent j starts to consume xˆ, x is unavailable and there
is an item o ∈ x such that o is unavailable when j starts to
consume xˆ. If we use t(o) and t(oˆ) to stand for the times
when o and oˆ exhausted in MPS respectively, we have t(o) ≤
t(oˆ) − pj,xˆ < t(oˆ). Besides, since (x, xˆ) ∈ C, we have
o ∈ Mˆ , a contradiction to that oˆ is one of top items according
to Seq in Mˆ .
(2) weak-sd-envy-freeness. Suppose P is the output of
MPS given any partial preference profile R. W.l.o.g we only
prove the case for agent 1 and agent 2, that is if P (2) sd1
P (1), then P (1) = P (2).
Suppose P (2) sd1 P (1). Suppose the topological order
of agent 1’s preference in MPS is x1 ′ x2 ′ ... ′ xnp .
There exists 0 = t0 ≤ t1 ≤ · · · ≤ tnp = 1 such that for any
i ≤ np, if p1,xi > 0, ti > ti−1 and ti is the time when xi is
exhausted, else ti = ti−1 and xi is unavailable at ti.
At the beginning, any bundle is available. Hence, p1,x1 >
0 and agent 1 starts to consume x1 at t0 = 0 till x1
is exhausted. That indicates p1,x1 ≥ p2,x1 . Since
P (2) sd1 P (1) and x1 is the first bundle in the topolog-
ical order over 1, we have p2,x1 =
∑
x∈U(1,x1) p2,x ≥∑
x∈U(1,x1) p1,x = p1,x1 . Therefore, p1,x1 = p2,x1 and
agent 1 and agent 2 are both consuming x1 in the whole in-
terval of [t0, t1).
Suppose for any i < k, p1,xi = p2,xi and agent 1 and
agent 2 are both consuming the same bundle at any time
in [ti−1, ti). We want to prove agent 1 and agent 2 are
both consuming the same bundle at any time in [tk−1, tk).
If tk = tk−1, that is true for [tk−1, tk). If tk > tk−1,
agent 1 is consuming xk in the whole interval of [tk−1, tk)
but never in [t0, tk−1). Hence, agent 2 never consumes
xk in [t0, tk−1). Since xk is exhausted at tk, we have
p1,xk = tk − tk−1 ≥ p2,xk . Since P2 sd1 P1, we
have
∑
x∈U(1,xk) p2,x ≥
∑
x∈U(1,xk) p1,x. Since U(1
,xk) ⊆ {x1,x2, ...,xk−1,xk} and p1,xi = p2,xi for any
i < k, we have p2,xk ≥ p1,xk . Therefore, p1,xk = p2,xk
and agent 1 and agent 2 are both consuming xk in the whole
interval of [tk−1, tk).
By induction, we have p1,xk = p2,xk for any k ≤ np.
Hence P (1) = P (2).
Counterexamples for Remark 2.
Remark 2. MPS is not ex-post-efficient since its output may
not be realizable when coming to multi-type resources. MPS
is not ordinally fair, sd-envy-free and upper invariant under
general partial preferences.
Proof. (1) MPS is not ex-post-efficient coming to multi-type
resources. We consider a special case for partial prefer-
ences, CP-net preferences with the same dependency graph
as shown in Figure 2. We can induce that the preferences are
1122 1 1112 1 2112 1 2122 and 1112 2 1122 2
2122 2 2112. MPS(R) is shown in matrix 4 which cannot
be realized obviously.
1112 1122 2112 2122
1 0 0.5 0.5 0
2 0.5 0 0 0.5
(4)
Figure 2: CP-net preferences with the same dependency graph: (a)
the dependency graph for agents; (b) CPTs for agent 1; (c) CPTs for
agent 2
(2) MPS is not ordinally fair and sd-envy-free under gen-
eral partial preferences. Consider the case whenN = {1, 2},
M = D1 = {11, 21}, and R = {1,2} where 1= ∅,
2= {11 2 21}. In MPS, the fixed topological orders
are 21 ′ 11 for 1 and 11 ′ 21 for 2. It is obvious
agent 1 gets 21 and agent 2 gets 12. Let P = MPS(R). We
have P2,12 > 0 and
∑
x∈U(2,12) P2,x >
∑
x∈U(1,12) P1,x.
Hence, MPS is not ordinally fair. We don’t have P (1) sd1
P (2). Hence, MPS is not sd-envy-free.
(3) MPS is not upper invariant under general partial pref-
erences. The counterexample of upper invariance for MRP
can be also an counterexample for MPS.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. No mechanism can satisfy both sd-efficiency
and sd-envy-freeness under general partial preferences.
Proof. We just consider the case of the allocation of single-
type items and it is easy to example in similar manner when
p ≥ 2. Consider the case when N = {1, 2, 3}, M =
D1 = {11, 21, 31}, and R = (j)j≤3 where 1= {11 1
21, 11 1 31, 21 1 31}, 2= {31 2 21, 31 2 11, 21 2
11}, and 3= ∅. It is easy to conclude that matrix (5) is the
only assignment matrix that agent 3 does not envy others un-
der the concept of sd-envy-freeness. However, it is dominated
by matrix (6).
11 21 31
1 13
1
3
1
3
2 13
1
3
1
3
3 13
1
3
1
3
(5)
11 21 31
1 23
1
3 0
2 0 13
2
3
3 13
1
3
1
3
(6)
Proof of Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. Given any CP-profile R, MRP(R) is upper
invariant for any other CP-profile R′.
Proof. W.l.o.g we only prove the cases when agent 1 lies.
Given any CP-profile R = (j)j≤n, let P be the expected
output of MRP under R. For any CP-profile R′ = (′1,−1)
where ′1 is an upper invariant transformation of 1 at y ∈D, let P ′ be the expected output of MRP under R′. Next, we
prove that Pj,y = P ′j,y for any j ≤ n by showing that given
any priority orderB over agents, any agent gets y under R′ if
and only if she gets y under R.
Since the preferences of other agents keep same, given B,
the sets of available bundles are same in agent 1’s turn under
R and R′. Suppose D′ ⊆ D is the set of all available bundles
in agent 1’s turn in MRP under R and R′. Suppose agent 1
gets x ∈ D′ underR and x′ ∈ D′ underR′. By Proposition 1,
x 1 z for any z 6= x ∈ D′ and x′ ′1 z′ for any z′ 6= x′ ∈D′. Given B, we divide all situations to two cases, y ∈ D′
and y /∈ D′.
Case 1, y ∈ D′. We have x ∈ U(1,y) and x′ ∈
U(′1,y). Since P1,x > 0, we have x ∈ U(′1,y) by
the definition of upper invariant transformation. If x 6= x′,
we have x 1 x′ and x′ ′1 x which is a contradic-
tion to the definition of upper invariant transformation where
′1|U(′1,y)=1|U(′1,y). Hence, x = x′ and agent 1 gets x
under R and R′. Therefore, all agents get the same bundles
under R and R′ in this case.
Case 2, y /∈ D′. Agents after agent 1 in B and agent 1 get
no y both under R and R′. Besides, agents before agent 1 in
B get the same bundles under R and R′. Hence, one agent
gets y under R′ if and only if she gets y under R in this case.
To sum up the two cases, given any priority order B over
agents, any agent gets y under R′ if and only if she gets y
under R. Therefore, Pj,y = P ′j,y for any j ≤ n.
Proof of Proposition 4.
Proposition 4. Given any CP-profile R, MPS(R) is upper
invariant for any other CP-profile R′.
Proof. W.l.o.g we only prove the cases when agent 1 lies.
Given any CP-profile R = (j)j≤n and any CP-profile R′ =
(′1,−1) where ′1 is an upper invariant transformation of1 at y ∈ D, let P = MPS(R) and P ′ = MPS(R′).
Let Dˆ = {x ∈ D : P1,x > 0} and nˆ = |Dˆ|. By Propo-
sition 1, we have an order over Dˆ such that x1 1 x2 1
· · · 1 xnˆ, xi ∈ Dˆ for any i ≤ nˆ. There is xi0 such that
under R, when agent 1 starts to consume xi0 , y is available
and after xi0 is exhausted, y is unavailable. Suppose ti is the
time when xi is exhausted for i ≤ nˆ under R. Let t0 = 0.
Next, we prove that the consumption processes of all agents
are same before ti0 under R and R
′ by induction.
Suppose before tk (k < i0), the consumption processes of
all agents are same under R and R′ (That is true for k = 0).
Hence, the remaining resources are same under R and R′ at
tk. If agent 1 turns to consume xk+1 under R′ at tk, the con-
sumption processes are same between tk and tk+1 because
the preferences of the other agents are same under R and R′.
Next, we prove that xk+1 is the exact bundle agent 1 turns
to at tk. Suppose D′ ⊆ D is the set of all available bundle
at tk under R and R′. By Proposition 1, xk+1 1 xˆ for any
xˆ 6= xk+1 ∈ D′. As the same reason, there is x ∈ D′ such
that x ′1 xˆ for any xˆ 6= x ∈ D′. Since k < i0, y is avail-
able at tk. Hence, xk+1 ∈ U(1,y) and x ∈ U(′1,y).
Since P1,xk+1 > 0, we have xk+1 ∈ U(′1,y) by the def-
inition of upper invariant transformation. If x 6= xk+1, we
have x ′1 xk+1 and xk+1 1 x which is a contradic-
tion to the definition of upper invariant transformation where
′1|U(′1,y)=1|U(′1,y). Hence, x = xk+1, agent 1 turns to
xk+1 at tk under R′ and the consumption processes are same
between tk and tk+1 under R and R′.
By induction, the consumption processes of all agents are
same before ti0 under R and R
′. Hence, the consumption
processes are same until y is exhausted. Hence, Pj,y = P ′j,y
for any j ≤ n.
Counterexample for Remark 3.
Remark 3. MPS is not weak-sd-strategyproof under CP-net
preferences.
Proof. Consider the case when N = {1, 2}, M =
{11, 21, 12, 22}. The CP-net preference of agent 1 is shown
as (a) and (b) in Figure 3 while agent 2’s is shown as (c) and
(d). We can induce that 1112 1 1122 1 2122 1 2112
and 1122 2 2122 2 2112 2 1112. If agent 1 doesn’t lie,
she will get 0.5 1112, 0.25 2122, and 0.25 2112 in MPS. But
if she lies about her dependency graph as (c) in Figure 3 and
her CPTs as (e), her preference becomes 2122 ′1 1122 ′1
1112 ′1 2112 and she will get 0.5 2122 and 0.5 1112 in MPS,
a better result for him.
Figure 3: CP-net preferences
Proof of Proposition 5.
Proposition 5. Given any CP-profile R with a identical de-
pendency graph, MPS(R) is weak-sd-strategyproof for any
other CP-profile R′ with the same dependency graph.
Proof. W.l.o.g we only prove that it is unprofitable for agent
1 to lie. Given any CP-profile R with a identical dependency
graph, suppose agent 1 misreports his preferences as ′1. Let
R′ = (′1,−1) shch thatR′ is also CP-profile with the same
dependency graph. Let P = MPS(R) and P ′ = MPS(R′).
Suppose P ′ sd1 P . Our aim is to prove that P (1) = P ′(1).
For any y ∈ ∏S , S ⊆ T , we define U(,y) = {yˆ :
(yˆ, z)  (y, z),∀z ∈ ∏−S or yˆ = y}. We use An(Di) to
denote the set of types corresponding to the ancestors ofDi in
the dependency graph. Since each x ∈∏Pa(Di) corresponds
to a linear order over Di in CPT (Di), each y ∈
∏
An(Di)
does as well and we use y to denote the order.
Before the main body of the proof, we list three claims
about CP-net for convenience.
Claim 1. Given any acyclic CP-net , for any Di ∈ T , let
S = An(Di) or S = An(Di) ∪ Di. For any x ∈
∏
S , and
xˆ ∈ ∏S , if there are some y ∈ ∏−S , yˆ ∈ ∏−S such that
(x,y)  (xˆ, yˆ), then we have x ∈ U(, xˆ).
Proof: We only prove the claim when S = An(Di) since
the proof when S = An(Di) ∪ Di is similar. Given any
acyclic CP-net , for any x ∈ ∏S , xˆ ∈ ∏S , suppose there
are some y ∈ ∏−S , yˆ ∈ ∏−S such that (x,y)  (xˆ, yˆ).
Then there exists one path from (x,y) to (xˆ, yˆ) in the prefer-
ence graph of . Suppose the path is (x1,y1)  (x2,y2) 
· · ·  (xt,yt) such that x1 = x, y1 = y, xt = xˆ, yt = yˆ,
and only one pair of items is different between (xk,yk) and
(xk+1,yk+1) for any k < t. For any z ∈
∏
−S , we try to
find a path from (x, z) to (xˆ, z) by referring the path from
(x,y) to (xˆ, yˆ). Let E = ∅. For any k < t, suppose
the different items between (xk,yk) and (xk+1,yk+1) be-
long to Dik ∈ T . If Dik ∈ S, we have Pa(Dik) ⊆ S and
yk = yk+1. Hence (xk, z)  (xk+1, z). Add the edge be-
tween xkz and xk+1z to E. It is obvious that all edges in E
make up the path from xz to xˆz. Therefore xz  xˆz for any
z ∈∏−S , that is x ∈ U(, xˆ). 
Claim 2. Given any CP-profile R and two assignment matri-
ces Q and P , for any Di ∈ T and j ≤ n, let Sj = An(Di) or
Sj = An(Di)∪Di underj . IfQ sdj P , for any x0 ∈
∏
Sj
,
we have ∑
x∈U(j ,x0)
Qj,x ≥
∑
x∈U(j ,x0)
Pj,x.
Proof: Given any CP-profile R and two assignment matri-
ces Q and P , for any Di ∈ T and j ≤ n, we only prove the
case when Sj = An(Di) since the other case can be prove in
like manner. Let Sj = An(Di) and suppose Q sdj P .
For any S ⊆ T , D ∈ S, and x ∈ ∏S , we define function
fD as fD(x) = o such that o ∈ x and o ∈ D. For any
x0 ∈
∏
Sj
, we select a special bundle y0 by follow steps.
1. Select items for y0 from any D ∈ Sj such that
fD(y0) = fD(x0). Let Sˆ = Sj , Mˆ = {o ∈ M :
o ∈ x0} and k = 1.
2. If there exists no D ∈ T such that Pa(D) ⊆ Sˆ and
D /∈ Sˆ, we stop our selection. Let Dk ∈ T such that
Pa(Dk) ⊆ Sˆ and Dk /∈ Sˆ. Since Pa(Dk) ⊆ Sˆ, there
is ok ∈ Dk such that for any o ∈ Dk, agent j prefers o
than ok when she is holding Mˆ . Select ok for y0 such
that fDk(y0) = ok. Let Sˆ = Sˆ ∪ {Dk}, Mˆ = Mˆ ∪ ok,
and k = k + 1. Repeat this step again.
Since any j is an acyclic CP-net, Sˆ = T when we stop our
selection for y0. Hence, y0 = (x0, o1o2...ok).
For any x ∈ U(j ,x0), any z = oˆ1oˆ2...oˆk ∈
∏
−Sj ,
if x 6= x0, we have (x, oˆ1oˆ2...oˆk) j (x0, oˆ1oˆ2...oˆk).
Since (x0, oˆ1oˆ2...oˆk) j (x0, o1oˆ2...oˆk) j (x0, o1o2...oˆk)
j · · · j (x0, o1o2...ok), we have (x, oˆ1oˆ2...oˆk) j
(x0, o1o2...ok). Therefore,∑
x∈U(j ,x0)
Qj,x =
∑
x∈U(j ,x0)
∑
z∈∏−Sj
Qj,xz
≤
∑
y∈U(j ,y0)
Qj,y.
For any (x, oˆ1oˆ2...oˆk) ∈ D such that (x, oˆ1oˆ2...oˆk) j
(x0, o1o2...ok), by Claim 1, we have x ∈ U(j ,x0). Hence,∑
x∈U(j ,x0)
Qj,x =
∑
x∈U(j ,x0)
∑
z∈∏−Sj
Qj,xz
≥
∑
y∈U(j ,y0)
Qj,y.
Therefore, ∑
x∈U(j ,x0)
Qj,x =
∑
y∈U(j ,y0)
Qj,y.
In like manner, we have∑
x∈U(j ,x0)
Pj,x =
∑
y∈U(j ,y0)
Pj,y.
Since Q sdj P ,
∑
y∈U(j ,y0)Qj,y ≥
∑
y∈U(j ,y0) Pj,y.
Hence we have
∑
x∈U(j ,x0)Qj,xa ≥
∑
x∈U(j ,x0) Pj,xa.

Claim 3. Under MPS, given any CP-profile R, for any Di ∈
T and j ≤ n, let S = An(Di) or S = An(Di)∪{Di}. Then
there exists x1 j x2 j · · · j xl and 0 = t0 < t1 <
· · · < tl = 1 such that xk ∈
∏
S , tk is the time when xk is
exhausted and agent j starts to consume xj at tj−1 for j ≤ l.
Proof: By Proposition 1, at the beginning of MPS, agent
j starts to consume her unique favorite bundle y1 ∈ D. Let
x1 ∈
∏
S such that any item in x1 is an item in y1. Since
Pj,y1 > 0, we have 0 = t0 < t1. Let m = 2, then we find xk
and tk (k = 2, 3, ..., l) in the loop of k. Suppose agent j turns
to consume yk+1 when she exhausts yk (k = 1, 2, ..., l′ − 1
and when yl′ is exhausted, MPS ends). By Proposition 1, we
have yk j yk+1. Let xˆk, xˆk+1 ∈
∏
S such that any item
in xˆk is an item in yk and any item in xˆk+1 is an item in
yk+1. By Claim 1, we have xˆk = xˆk+1 or xˆk j xˆk+1. If
xˆk j xˆk+1, let xm = xˆk+1, tm be the time when yk is
exhausted and add m by 1. 
Now, we begin the main body of the proof. Under CP-
profile R with a share dependency graph, let S(j, t,Di) be
the bundle x ∈ ∏An(Di)∪Di that agent j is consuming at t.
Let t(o) for any o ∈ M be the time when o is exhausted,
N(o, t) be the set of agents who are consuming o at t and
n(o, t) = |N(o, t)|. We have t(o) = sup{t : n(o, t) ≥ 1}.
Under R′, we can define S′(j, t,Di), N ′(a, t) and n′(a, t) in
a similar way.
The main idea of the proof is to prove a stronger conclu-
sion than P1 = P ′1 that S(j, t,Di) = S
′(j, t,Di) for any
j ≤ n, t ∈ [1, 0) and Di ∈ T . To achieve that, we prove
S(j, t,Di) = S
′(j, t,Di) for any Pa(Di) = ∅ firstly, then
the proof of S(j, t,Di) = S′(j, t,Di) for Pa(Di) 6= ∅ goes
by induction on types.
For any Di ∈ T and Pa(Di) = ∅, by Claim 3, there ex-
ists o1 1 o2 1 · · · 1 ol and 0 = t0 < t1 < · · · <
tl = 1 such that ok ∈ Di (k ≤ l), P1,o = 0 for any
o /∈ {o1, o2, ..., ol} and agent 1 is consuming ok during the
whole interval [tk−1, tk).
Suppose for any j ≤ n, m < k, and t ∈ [tm−1, tm),
we have S(j, t,Di) = S′(j, t,Di). That is true for k = 1.
Next we prove S(j, t,Di) = S′(j, t,Di) for any t ∈ [0, 1) by
induction on k.
We claim that there exists no o ∈ Di such that o 1 ok,
o /∈ {o1, o2, ..., ok−1}, and P ′1,o > 0. Otherwise, since
S(j, t,Di) = S
′(j, t,Di) for any j ≤ n, t ∈ [0, tk−1), o
is available at tk−1 but o 1 ok and agent 1 starts to con-
sume ok at tk−1, a contradiction. Therefore, by P ′ sd P
and Claim 2, we have
∑k
m=1 P
′
1,om =
∑
o∈U(1,ok) P
′
1,o ≥∑
o∈U(1,ok) P1,o =
∑k
m=1 P1,om . By the inductive as-
sumption, we have P1,om = P
′
1,om for any m < k. Hence,
P ′1,ok ≥ P1,ok . Agent 1 is consuming ok during the whole
interval [tk−1, t(ok)) under R but during the sub interval of
[tk−1, t′(ok)) under R′. Therefore, t(ok) ≤ t′(ok).
We claim that for all t ∈ [0, t(ok)) and all agents j, j 6= 1,
we have:
j ∈ N(ok, t)⇒ j ∈ N ′(ok, t). (7)
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that there is an agent j,
j 6= 1, and a time t, 0 ≤ t < t(ok) such that j ∈ N(ok, t)
and j ∈ N ′(oˆ1, t), for some item oˆ1 6= ok ∈ Di. As
t < t(ok) ≤ t′(ok), ok is available at time t under R′ and
oˆ1 j ok (because the preferences of agent j are same un-
der R and R′). So oˆ1 is unavailable at t under R. This
says t(oˆ1) ≤ t < t′(oˆ1). Let A = {o ∈ Di : o 6=
ok ∧ t(o) < t′(o)}, we have oˆ1 ∈ A and A 6= ∅. We
pick oˆ2 in A such that t(oˆ2) = min{t(o) : o ∈ A}. Note
that t(oˆ2) < t(ok) because t(oˆ1) < t(ok) and oˆ1 ∈ A.
We claim that at some t < t(oˆ2), there is an agent jˆ such
that jˆ ∈ N(oˆ2, t) and jˆ /∈ N ′(oˆ2, t). Otherwise we have
N(oˆ2, t) ⊆ N ′(oˆ2, t) for t ∈ [0, t(oˆ2)). And there is some
sub interval of [t(oˆ2), t′(oˆ2)) such that n′(oˆ2, t) ≥ 1 for any
t in the sub interval since t′(oˆ2) = sup{t : n′(oˆ2, t) ≥ 1}.
Hence ∫ t(oˆ2)
0
n(oˆ2, t)dt <
∫ t′(oˆ2)
0
n′(oˆ2, t)dt, (8)
a contradiction with∫ t(oˆ2)
0
n(oˆ2, t)dt = 1 =
∫ t′(oˆ2)
0
n′(oˆ2, t)dt. (9)
Note that jˆ 6= 1 because agent 1 is consuming ok dur-
ing [tk−1, t(ok)) under R. Suppose jˆ ∈ N(oˆ2, t) and jˆ ∈
N ′(oˆ3, t), for some t < t(oˆ2) and oˆ3 ∈ Di. As oˆ2 is avail-
able at t under R′ (because t < t(oˆ2) < t′(oˆ2)), we have
oˆ3 jˆ oˆ2. Hence oˆ3 is unavailable at t under R (jˆ 6= 1
and her preferences are same under R and R′). Therefore,
t(oˆ3) < t < t
′(oˆ3) and t(oˆ3) < t < t(oˆ2), a contradiction
with t(oˆ2) = min{t(o) : o ∈ A}.
Thus we have shown N(ok, t) ⊆ N ′(ok, t) for t ∈
[0, t(ok)). If t(ok) < t′(ok), we would have a contradic-
tion like (8) and (9). Hence t(ok) = t′(ok) = tk. Since
P ′1,ok ≥ P1,ok and P1,ok = t(ok) − tk−1, agent a is con-
suming ok during the whole interval [tk−1, t′(ok)) under R′
and P ′1,ok = P1,ok . Since the preferences of all agents except
agent 1 keep same under R and R′, S(j, t,Di) = S′(j, t,Di)
for any j ∈ N and t ∈ [tk−1, tk).
By induction, we have S(j, t,Di) = S′(j, t,Di) for any
j ≤ N , any t ∈ [0, 1), any Di ∈ T such that Pa(Di) = ∅.
Now, we consider Di ∈ T such that Pa(Di) 6= ∅. We
prove S(j, t,Di) = S′(j, t,Di) for any Di ∈ T , j ≤ n and
t ∈ [0, 1) by induction on Di.
Suppose for any Diˆ ∈ An(Di), j ≤ n and t ∈ [0, 1), we
have
S(j, t,Diˆ) = S
′(j, t,Diˆ). (10)
For convenience, we use xo ∈ ∏An(Di)∪{Di} to denote
some y ∈ ∏An(Di)∪{Di} such that x ∈ ∏An(Di) and
o ∈ Di. By Claim 3, under R, there exists x1o1 1 x2o2 1
· · · 1 xlol and 0 = t0 < t1 < · · · < tl = 1 such
that xk ∈
∏
An(Di)
, ok ∈ Di(k ≤ l), P1,xo = 0 for any
xo /∈ {x1o1,x2o2, ...,xlol} and agent 1 is consuming ok dur-
ing the whole interval [tk−1, tk).
Suppose for any j ≤ n, any m < k, any t ∈ [tm−1, tm),
we have S(j, t,Di) = S′(j, t,Di). That is true for k = 1.
We prove S(j, t,Di) = S′(j, t,Di) for any t ∈ [1, 0) by
induction on k.
In like manner above, we have P ′1,xkok ≥ P1,xkok . Agent
1 is consuming xkok during the whole interval [tk−1, t(ok))
underR but during the sub interval of [tk−1, t′(ok)) underR′.
If k = l or xk 6= xk+1, by inductive assumption
(10), agent 1 has no chance to consum xk after tk and
P1,xk = P
′
1,xk
. Hence we have P1,xkok = P1,xk −∑
m<k,xm=xk
P1,xmom = P
′
1,xk
−∑m<k,um=xk P ′1,xmom ≥
P ′1,xkok . Hence, P1,xkok = P
′
1,xkok
and S(1, t,Di) =
S′(1, t,Di) = ok for any t ∈ [tk−1, tk). Besides, we have
S(j, t,Di) = S
′(j, t,Di) for any j ≤ n and t ∈ [tk−1, tk)
since the preferences of other agents keep same under R
(Preferences over
∏
Pa(Di)∪{Di} only depend on the items
in Pa(Di) ∪ {Di} as R is CP-profile with a identical depen-
dency graph).
If k 6= l and xk = xk+1, ok is exhausted at tk and t(ok) =
tk. We claim that for all t ∈ [0, t(ok)) and all agents j, j 6= 1,
we have:
j ∈ N(ok, t)⇒ j ∈ N ′(ok, t). (11)
By inductive assumption (10), for any j ∈ N , agent j are
consuming some x ∈∏An(Di) at any t ∈ [0, 1) under R and
R′. For any j 6= 1, t ∈ [0, 1), suppose agent j is consuming
x ∈ ∏An(Di), under R and R′. For any oˆ1, oˆ2 ∈ Di, if
j ∈ N(oˆ1, t), j ∈ N ′(oˆ2, t) and t(oˆ1) ≤ t′(oˆ1), we have
xoˆ2 ∈ U(j ,xoˆ1) by Claim 1 since xoˆ1 is available at t
under R′. Then oˆ2 is unavailable at t under R since j ∈
N(oˆ1, t). Hence we can conclude that if j ∈ N(oˆ1, t), j ∈
N ′(oˆ2, t) and t(oˆ1) ≤ t′(oˆ1), we have t(oˆ2) < t(oˆ1) and
t(oˆ2) < t
′(oˆ2). Therefore, in like manner of the proof in (7),
we can prove our claim (11). We have the conclusion that
N(ok, t) ⊆ N ′(ok, t) for t ∈ [0, t(ok)) by claim (11). In like
manner, we can prove that S(j, t,Di) = S′(j, t,Di) for any
j ≤ n and t ∈ [tk−1, tk).
By induction on k, we have S(j, t,Di) = S′(j, t,Di) for
any j ≤ n, t ∈ [0, 1).
By induction on Di, we have S(j, t,Di) = S′(j, t,Di) for
any j ≤ n, t ∈ [0, 1), Di ∈ T and Pa(Di) 6= ∅.
To sum up, we have prove that S(j, t,Di) = S′(j, t,Di)
for any j ≤ n, t ∈ [0, 1), Di ∈ T . Therefore, P1,y = P ′1,y
for any y ∈ D.
